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Abstract—This article proposes an enhanced PRIvacy pre-
serVing Opportunistic routing protocol (ePRIVO) for Vehicular
Delay-Tolerant Networks (VDTN). ePRIVO models a VDTN as
a time-varying neighboring graph where edges correspond to
neighboring relationship between pairs of vehicles. It addresses
the problem of vehicles taking routing decision meanwhile keep-
ing their information private, i.e, vehicles compute their similarity
and/or compare their routing metrics in a private manner using
the Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme.
The effectiveness of ePRIVO is supported through extensive
simulations with synthetic mobility models and a real mobility
trace. Simulation results show that ePRIVO presents on average
very low cryptographic costs in most scenarios. Additionally,
ePRIVO presents on average gains of approximately 29% and
238% in terms of delivery ratio for the real and synthetic sce-
narios considered compared to other privacy-preserving routing
protocols.
Index Terms—Privacy, Routing, Vehicular Delay-Tolerant Net-
works, Betweenness centrality, Similarity.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE future network infrastructure for vehicular environ-ments will increase the pervasiveness of the Internet
and the overall connectivity by integrating every object and
forming an intelligent vehicular transportation system (ITS).
Examples of vehicular applications include automatic collision
warning, remote vehicle diagnostics, emergency management
and assistance for safe driving, vehicle tracking, automobile
high-speed Internet access, and multimedia content sharing.
Nevertheless, the volume of data required for such applications
will continue to increase as the number of connected vehicles
increases and the use cases evolve. Communication protocols
for information transmission between vehicles and roadside
unit (RSU) infrastructure equipment, known as vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I), between vehicles and pedestrians, known
as vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P) as well as between vehicles,
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known as vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), become more inevitable
for applications of mobile content dissemination.
The opportunistic contacts enabled by vehicle-to-everything
(V2X) communications are capable of providing high band-
width communication capacity for data transmission, which
forms the basis of Vehicular Delay-Tolerant Networks
(VDTNs) [1]. VDTN network functions depend on the prin-
ciple of cooperation between vehicles, which includes the
strategies for signaling and reservation of resources (e.g.,
storage and bandwidth) [2]. The signaling functionality allows
for other vehicles discovery and resource’s reservation. When
two vehicles are in communication range, they may exchange
signaling information such as node type, geographical lo-
cation, current path, and velocity, energy and buffer status,
link rate and transmission ranges, that is considered dynamic
network information. However, static network information
may also be used [3]. Through social network analysis, static
network information, which is more stable over time, can be
leveraged and used by VDTN routing protocols to facilitate
the forwarding of messages. Centrality [4], which is widely
used in graph theory and network analysis, is a quantitative
measure of the structural importance of a certain vehicle in
relation to others within the vehicular network. In VDTNs,
central nodes may be considered good candidates to be relay
nodes. Among the centrality metrics, betweenness centrality
[4] can be considered the most prominent, as it measures
how well a node can facilitate communication among others
by summing up the fraction of shortest paths between other
pairs of nodes passing through it. Similarity [4], a measure of
common features of a group of nodes, can be computed, for
example, by finding common neighbor nodes they might have.
Computing routing metrics such as betweenness centrality
or similarity requires the exchange of information between
nodes. VDTN nodes represent vehicles or the entities owning
and managing them, and edges the relationship between two
entities. In VDTNs, information about entities owning and
managing VDTN nodes and their relationships may be private.
Other private information, which is also useful to improve
routing performance, is the node’s localization information
(e.g., geographical location, current path, and velocity) be-
cause it allows predicting the period of time during which
nodes’ links will be in range with each other. Therefore,
these links could be configured to be active only during these
times which would allow saving energy that is important to
network nodes with limited resources. VDTN applications
would benefit from mechanisms that enforce the entities’
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identities and/or relationship anonymity due to the sensitive or
confidential nature of the entities’ identities and their behav-
iors. A VDTN node may disclose private information that may
be necessary for routing purposes, by sending private data to
other nodes. Privacy-preservation techniques allow protecting
privacy through masking, modification and/or generalization
of the original data without sacrificing the data utility [5].
If it is considered that some vehicles might misbehave
maliciously or not by, for example, not forwarding others’
vehicles information, private information such as contacts’
history, list of neighbors, etc., which is required for computing
some routing metrics should not be disclosed to misbehaving
vehicles [6]. However, vehicles should be able to use part
of this information, if necessary. Furthermore, despite the
good routing performance of some of the proposed routing
protocols [3], [4], most of the security issues presented in
[6] (such as confidentiality, integrity, privacy, etc.) were not
considered. For instance, to deal with confidentiality and
privacy, vehicular communication protocols should implement
cryptographic mechanisms.
This article proposes an enhanced PRIvacy-preserVing Op-
portunistic routing protocol for Vehicular Delay-Tolerant Net-
works (ePRIVO). ePRIVO builds upon our previous work [5].
It models a VDTN as a time-varying neighboring graph where
edges correspond to the neighboring relationship between pairs
of vehicles. It addresses the problem of vehicles taking routing
decisions meanwhile keeping their information private, i.e,
vehicles compute their similarity and/or compare their routing
metrics in a private manner using the Paillier homomorphic
encryption scheme.
The contributions of this article are summarized as follows:
• ePRIVO, an enhanced and efficient privacy-preserving
routing protocol for VDTNs is proposed. A detailed
threat model and privacy analysis are presented and
different forwarding policies are considered to enhance
its performance. Addressing privacy issues in vehicular
networks is a hot research topic;
• Two anonymization methods (i.e., binary anonymization
and neighborhood randomization) to ensure privacy are
defined. They are used by VDTN nodes to exchange
neighborhood information;
• A secure approach to determine the similarity between
two interacting nodes is proposed. It allows determining
the least possible number of nodes to be shared between
the two interacting nodes without disclosing overtime
their nodes’ degrees.
• A privacy mechanism that uses the Paillier homomorphic
encryption scheme is proposed. It enables nodes to com-
pare their routing metrics without disclosing them.
• Through extensive simulations with synthetic mobility
models and a real-trace, and even by considering much
stronger hence nowadays more secure keys, it was shown
that our privacy-preserving approach achieves good per-
formance in vehicular networking environments.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section
II presents related work. Section III introduces notations and
assumptions. It also introduces relevant social metrics and
cryptographic mechanisms for this work. Section IV presents
the ePRIVO protocol. Section V presents the privacy analysis.
In Section VI, the simulation model and results are presented.
Finally, Section VII presents concluding remarks and future
work.
II. RELATED WORK
According to the literature [7], privacy breaches can be
classified as identity disclosure, link disclosure, and attribute
disclosure. Identity disclosure is the case when the identity
of the individual associated with the node is revealed. Link
disclosure happens when the sensitive relationship between
the individuals is disclosed. Attribute disclosure is the case
when the sensitive data associated with the node, owned by an
individual, is compromised. Moreover, there are several types
of sensitive information such as node attributes, specific link
relationships between nodes, nodes degrees, neighborhoods of
some target nodes, etc.
Anonymization methods [7] can be used to protect privacy
if sensitive information needs to be processed elsewhere.
There are three main anonymization methods, namely: (i) k-
anonymity privacy preservation via edge modification, that
modifies graph structure by successive deletions and additions
of edges so that each node in the modified graph is indis-
tinguishable with at least k − 1 other nodes in terms of a
given network property; (ii) edge randomization, that modifies
the graph structure by randomly adding/deleting edges or by
switching edges; and (iii) cluster-based generalization, where
nodes and edges are clustered into groups and anonymized
into a super-node.
It is commonly assumed in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks that
nodes are willing to share their private information for the
sake of the network’s performance. For instance, some routing
protocols that address privacy issues in DTNs and VDTNs
are referenced next. Routing approaches such as [8], [9], [10]
ensure attribute privacy. The location used by the source node
to send messages is protected in [8]. The context, e.g. personal
information, residence, work, hobbies, interest profiles, etc.,
which is used for forwarding is protected in [9], [10]. In
[11], the location information of individual vehicles during
its communication with RSUs is protected. However, privacy
issues resulting from V2V communications are not considered.
Both location and identity privacy are ensured through a group
communication scheme, i.e., a cluster-based generalization, for
sparse VDTNs in [12]. Privacy can only be guaranteed once
groups are formed, and forming them may take some time.
An approach based on Privacy by Architecture, in which
minimal information that identifies a user is sent to a Cer-
tificate Authority when requesting a certificate, was proposed
in [13]. It requires a complex pseudonym-based cryptographic
key management depending on the number of messages to be
sent. An identity-hidden message indexing mechanism is used
to protect the receiver’s location in [14]. It enables the receiver
to query for messages whose destination is itself without
revealing its identity to socialspot RSUs (e.g., intersections,
famous shopping malls, movie theatres) in a VDTN. In [15],
an adaptive mechanism for achieving user anonymity that
ensures identity privacy is proposed. Identity privacy can be
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compromised if an attacker combines external knowledge with
observed network structure [7].
In [16], an approach that ensures link privacy has been
proposed where instead of transmitting the list of friends of
the sender as a list of nodes, a modified and obfuscated one
is transmitted. Two strategies, namely meeting relationship
anonymity and forwarder anonymity, were proposed in [17] to
protect private information (e.g., probabilities of meeting other
nodes) in utility-based routing protocols. The cryptographic
mechanisms used leaks information such as the order of
the plaintexts, besides the results of the ciphertexts being
known by the intervening parties. A privacy-preserving packet
forwarding protocol, which is based on threshold credit-
based incentive mechanism, is proposed in [18]. It addresses
the resisting layer-adding attack by outsourcing the privacy-
preserving aggregated transmission evidence generation for
multiple resource-constrained vehicles to the cloud side. A
trusted third party (TTP) is required to generate evidence of
the vehicles’ behavior, and attribute privacy is only considered
at the cloud-assisted VDTN. In [19], a privacy-preserving
prediction-based probabilistic routing was proposed to avoid
disclosing the mobility patterns of the nodes. Messages are
forwarded comparing aggregated information about commu-
nities instead of individual nodes. More efficient privacy-
preserving routing protocols such as ePRIVO could be used
to disseminate messages within a community.
Other privacy techniques have been proposed in the litera-
ture. For instance, with homomorphic encryption – proposed
by Rivest et al. in 1978 [20] – a node can carry out compu-
tations on encrypted values, without needing to decrypt them
first. In [21] and PrivHab+ [22], privacy-preserving routing
protocols based on additive homomorphic encryption (Paillier
cryptosystem [23]) were proposed. The former, which was
proposed for peer-to-peer networks, allowed a node to calcu-
late its similarity to other nodes using multivariate polynomial
evaluation, meanwhile, the latter, which was proposed as a
secure geographical routing protocol for DTNs, allowed nodes
to compare their habitats in order to choose the best forwarder
for every message, respectively. Besides PrivHab+, which is
not suitable for social DTNs and only ensures attribute privacy,
none of the above approaches protects the nodes’ private
information if it has to be shared and processed elsewhere (link
privacy), or used during routing decisions (attribute privacy).
ePRIVO ensures both link and attribute privacy.
In [5], a previous work of ours, a privacy-preserving routing
protocol, known as PRIVO, was proposed for DTNs. The ap-
proach used by PRIVO’s anonymization methods to determine
the least possible number of nodes that two nodes should
share could disclose over some interactions the nodes’ degrees.
PRIVO also lacked a privacy analysis of its mechanisms
and the performance evaluation was done with key sizes
considered unsecure nowadays. On the other hand, ePRIVO is
an efficient and enhanced privacy-preserving routing protocol
for VDTNs. In VDTNs, differently from DTNs, vehicles
use V2X communications to disseminate messages. ePRIVO
proposes a secure mechanism to allow nodes to determine their
similarity, therefore avoiding to disclose the nodes’ degrees
after some interactions. A detailed threat model and privacy
Fig. 1. Illustration of a vehicular application integrating 5G network and V2X
opportunistic communications.
analysis of ePRIVO are presented. The performance evaluation
of ePRIVO was done with much stronger, thus nowadays more
secure key sizes. And last, but not least important, different
forwarding policies were considered to enhance ePRIVO’s
performance.
III. PRELIMINARIES AND BACKGROUND
A. Assumptions and notations
a) Notation: A notation similar to [4] is used. A VDTN
neighboring graph is modeled as a time-varying graph G =
(V,E, T , w) where each vertex v ∈ V corresponds to a node
in the network and each edge e = (i, j) ∈ E represents the
relationship between these nodes (i.e., that these nodes have
encountered before). The relations among nodes are assumed
to take place over a time span T ∈ T known as the lifetime
of the network; w : E × T → [0, 1] is called weight function
and indicates the strength of an edge at a given time.
Let a footprint of G from t1 to t2 be defined as a static graph
G[t1,t2) = (V,E[t1,t2)) such that ∀e ∈ E, e ∈ E[t1,t2) ⇐⇒
∃ t ∈ [t1, t2) , w (e, t) ∈ [0, 1], i.e., the footprint aggregates
all interactions of a given time window (or timeslot) into
static graphs. Let τ = [t0, t1) , [t1, t2) , . . . , [ti, ti+1) , . . .
(where [tk, tk+1) can be noted τk) be the lifetime T of the
time-varying graph partitioned in sub-intervals. The sequence
SF (τ) = Gτ0 , Gτ1 , . . . is called sequence of footprints of G
according to τ .
b) Scenario: Consider the network topology in Figure
1, where vehicles and pedestrians, travel around the city and
the deployed RSUs provide coverage over a certain area.
RSUs are placed at the intersections similarly to what is
done by current optimal placement algorithms [24]. RSUs are
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connected through wired links to 5G Radio Access Networks
(RANs) that are also connected to the content server on the
Internet. Vehicles requiring mobile data (or messages) send
their requests to the content server via V2X communication
links. The requested data is delivered from the content server
to the 5G RAN and from the 5G RAN to the RSUs or
pedestrians via the wired and wireless links, respectively. It is
assumed that the wired links provide relatively high bandwidth
hence ensuring that the requested data is delivered to RSUs
prior to the delay-tolerant dissemination between RSUs and
vehicles. RSUs and pedestrians will further disseminate the
data to the users in the vehicles that requested it through
opportunistic communication, i.e., in a store-carry-and-forward
manner, that occurs when the vehicle moves into the commu-
nication coverage of RSUs or pedestrians.
In Figure 1, some vehicles such as V1, V5 and V6 only
carry messages destined to themselves, conversely to V2 that
does not carry any messages destined to itself. If V2 requests
message 8, and since V5 has it, V2 would have to rely on
V2V communications between V5 and V4, and between V4
and itself to get the message. Alternatively, it could also wait
until it gets into communication range of the RSU to get
message 8 through a V2I communication with the RSU. Please
note that the words vehicle and node are used interchangeably
throughout the article.
c) Node capability: Each node has a Unique IDentifier
(UID) that cannot be spoofed. Upon an encounter between
two nodes, a secure communication channel between the
two is used through cryptographic mechanisms that ensure
confidentiality.
d) Attack model: It is assumed an adversary model in
which malicious nodes are also vehicles similarly to good
nodes. However, they try to learn the private information of
others through the following brute-force attacks (BFAs):
• Neighboring graph BFA: In this attack, a malicious
node tries to discover other nodes’ historical encounter
information (i.e., the neighboring graph) by querying for
all possible nodes and storing the received weights.
• Node metric BFA: In this attack, a malicious node tries to
discover the routing metric of the other node it came in
contact with by sending its different (fake) routing metrics
over a series of contacts until the correct routing metric
value of the other node is found.
B. Background
1) Social metrics: A variety of network information has
been used to address the challenging task of finding the
most suitable node to forward messages in a VDTN, namely
dynamic network information (e.g., location, traffic, encounter
information, etc.) and social network information (e.g., social
relations among nodes). However, social network information
is more stable over time than dynamic network information
and can be leveraged by VDTN routing protocols to facilitate
the forwarding of messages [3].
a) Ego betweenness centrality: Centrality of a node in
a network is a quantitative measure of the structural impor-
tance of this node in relation to others within the network.
Typically, a node can be considered as central if it plays
an important role in the network’s connectivity, for example,
if it is more apt to connect to others in the network. The
three most common centrality metrics are degree, closeness
and betweenness centrality [4]. Degree centrality is defined
as the number of links (that is, direct neighbors) incident
upon a given node. Besides being a local metric, it only
takes into account the number of neighbors of a given node,
thus not taking into consideration the global structure of the
network. Closeness centrality is defined as the total shortest
path distance from a given node to all other nodes. However, it
lacks applicability in networks with disconnected components.
Betweenness centrality is defined as the number of geodesics
(shortest paths) passing through a given node. Betweenness
centrality can be perceived as a measure of the load placed on
a given node since it measures how well a node can facilitate
communication among others. Betwenesss takes into account
the global structure of the network, and it can be applied
to networks with disconnected components. ePRIVO uses a
betweenness centrality metric that does not require global
knowledge, hence being more suitable for VDTNs.
An ego network [25] (also known as the neighborhood
network of the ego) is defined as a network that consists of
a central node (ego) along with its direct neighbors (the other
nodes the ego is directly connected to) and all links among
these neighbors. The shortest paths, due to the structure of the
ego network, are either of length 1 or 2. Every single pair
of non-adjacent direct neighbors must have a shortest path of
length 2 which passes through the ego. Shortest paths of length
1 do not contribute to the betweenness centrality computation.
If A is an adjacency matrix of graph G, then A2i,j contains the
number of geodesics of length 2 connecting vertices i and j.
The number of shortest paths between i and j is given by
A2[1−A]i,j (where 1 is a matrix of all 1’s).
The ego betweenness centrality (cEBC) is the sum of the
halved reciprocal entries A2[1−A]i,j such that Ai,j= 0.
b) Similarity: Similarity [26] expresses the number of
common features of a group in social networks. In sociology,
the probability of two individuals being acquainted increases
with the number of common acquaintances between them [27].
In computer networks, the similarity between nodes i and j
can be defined as the number of common neighbors among
them. Therefore, the more common neighbors they have, the
more similar they are.
2) Homomorphic encryption: In cryptography, finding
common elements in two private sets without exposing the
sets themselves is known as the Private Set Intersection (PSI)
problem [28]. For instance, an algorithm that solves the PSI
problem would allow a trusted node to send an encrypted
version of some data to be processed by an untrusted node
and the latter would perform computations on this encrypted
data without knowing anything of the data’s real value and
send back the result. The trusted node would expect the
decrypted result to be equal to the intended computed value
as if it was performed on the original data. For example, with
homomorphic encryption, a node can carry out computations
on encrypted values, without decrypting them first.
If addition operators are considered, the scheme is addi-
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tively homomorphic. Likewise, if multiplication operators are
considered, the scheme is multiplicatively homomorphic. An
additive homomorphic encryption scheme is the one in which
two numbers encrypted with the same key E(a) and E(b) can
be added without being first decrypted, i.e., one can efficiently
compute E(a+ b) without decrypting them.
In the Paillier cryptosystem [29], which is an additive
homomorphic encryption scheme, when entity i wants to send
message m to entity j, entity i selects random primes p and q
and constructs n = pq; plaintext messages are elements of Zn
and cyphertext are elements of Zn2 . Entity i picks a random
g ∈ Z∗n2 and verifies that ∃µ where µ = (L(gλ mod n2))
−1
mod n , L (x) = (x− 1)/n and λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1). If @µ
then a new random g ∈ Z∗n2 must be picked. Entity i’s public
key pk is (n, g) and private key sk is (λ, µ).
To encrypt a message m, entity j picks a random r ∈ Z∗n
and computes the ciphertext c= E (m) = gm · rn mod n2,
therefore cyphering with pk. To decrypt c, entity i computes
D (c) =
(
L(c
λ mod n2)
)−1
· µ mod n = m, therefore
deciphering with sk.
Let E (a) = ga · rn1 mod n2 and E (b) = gb · rn2 mod n2.
Entity j can compute the sum this way: E (a+ b) = E (a) ·
E (b) mod n2 = ga+b · (r1r2)n mod n2.
Let E (a) = ga · rn1 mod n2 and k be a non-encrypted
constant. Entity j can compute the multiplication by a non-
encrypted constant E (k · a) = E (a)k mod n2 = gk·a ·
(r1)
n mod n2.
IV. THE EPRIVO PROTOCOL
This section introduces the enhanced PRIvacy-preserVing
Opportunistic routing protocol for Vehicular Delay-Tolerant
Networks (ePRIVO). ePRIVO detects and utilizes the inherent
social network structure to facilitate message forwarding in
VDTNs. It models a VDTN as a time-varying neighboring
graph where vertices correspond to nodes and edges corre-
spond to the neighboring relationship between pairs of nodes.
ePRIVO ensures privacy by means of anonymization and
homomorphic encryption. It uses anonymization and homo-
morphic encryption to avoid disclosing historical information
associated with each node’s neighboring graph. When two
nodes meet, they do not share private information associated
with their routing metrics, which is necessary to identify the
best message forwarder. Nodes compare these metrics in a
private manner also using homomorphic encryption.
The ePRIVO protocol is composed of the following steps:
construction and anonymization of the neighboring graph,
determination of routing metrics and the routing algorithm.
In order to facilitate future references, frequently used
notations in this article are listed in Table I.
A. Construction of the neighboring graph
Let H = (VH , EH) be a subgraph of G = (V,E), denoted
H ⊂ G, if and only if VH ⊂ V and EH ⊂ E. H is a
local subgraph (hereafter neighboring graph) with respect to
a vertex v ∈ V , if and only if all vertices in the subgraph can
be directly reached from v. Let xi,j(t) denote the separation
TABLE I
THE MOST USED NOTATIONS IN THIS ARTICLE
Notation Meaning
xi,j(t) The separation period between nodes i and j
τk The elapsed time (or timeslot) between tk and tk+1
δ(i,j),τk (x) The average separation period between nodes i and j at
timeslot τk
wi,j The ePRIVO weight
ρ The anonymization threshold
ε The weight threshold
η The number of timeslots
ζAB The similarity between nodes A and B
Hv Neighboring graph of node v
period between nodes i and j, τk denote the elapsed time and
ni,j be the number of times that nodes i and j were away from
each other. So, xi,j (t) = 0 means that nodes i and j are within
communication range at time t ∈ τk, otherwise xi,j (t) = 1.
The time-varying average separation period between nodes i
and j at timeslot τk (hereafter average separation period) is
given by
δ(i,j),τk(x) =
∫
τk
xi,j (t) dt
ni,j
(1)
The normalized average separation period δˆτk at timeslot τk
is given by
δˆτk := δˆ(i,j),τk(x) = 1−
δ(i,j),τk(x)
|τk| (2)
where |τk| is the duration of τk. Here, the lifetime T consists
of many days, and each day consists of a fixed number of
timeslots. The average separation period aims at capturing the
evolution of social interactions in similar timeslots.
The normalized average separation period in the same times-
lot τk over consecutive days is updated using an exponential
weighted moving average (EWMA) as follows
∆tτk =
{
δˆ1τk , t = 1
(1− α) ·∆t−1τk + α · δˆtτk , t > 1
(3)
where α is the smoothing factor, and 0 < α < 1. δˆtτk is the
value of δˆτk at day t and ∆
t
τk
is the estimate of δˆτk at any day
t. If not updated, i.e., δˆtτk = 0 which means that nodes i and
j were away from each other at τk of day t, it is depreciated
as follows
∆tτk = (1− α) ·∆t−1τk (4)
The unbiased variance estimator σˆ at timeslot τk of day t
(σˆtτk), which allows measuring the variability of δˆτk , is given
by
σˆtτk =

∣∣∣∆1τk − δˆ1τk ∣∣∣ , t = 1
(1− β) · σˆt−1τk + β ·
∣∣∣∆tτk − δˆtτk ∣∣∣ , t > 1 (5)
where 0 < β < 1.
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The social strength among nodes in a specific daily timeslot
may provide insights on their social strength in consecutive
timeslots on the same day, therefore increasing the probability
of nodes being capable of transmitting data as transmissions
could be resumed, with high probability, on the same times-
lot on the next day. The time-varying ePRIVO weight wi,j
(hereafter pweight) over a daily time-period is given by
wi,j =
1
|τ t|
|τt|∑
k=1
∆tτk (6)
where |τ t| is the number of timeslots of day t; pweight shows
the neighboring relationship among nodes and gives hints
about the forwarding opportunities between them, i.e., larger
wi,j indicates a better future contact probability between nodes
i and j.
In ePRIVO, nodes’ routines are used to quantify the time-
varying strength of social ties between nodes. For instance, if
daily routines are considered, each node computes the average
separation periods to other nodes during the same set of daily
timeslots over consecutive days.
B. Anonymization of the neighboring graph
A VDTN node may disclose private information by sending
private data to other nodes. Privacy-preservation techniques
allow protecting privacy through masking, modification and/or
generalization of the original data without sacrificing data
utility.
1) The similarity privacy mechanism: ePRIVO proposes
the similarity privacy mechanism, which is based on the
Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme. The mechanism
addresses the PSI problem [21] by allowing a node, say A,
to calculate its similarity to another node, say B, in a private
manner.
Let HA and HB be the neighboring graphs of nodes A
and B, respectively. A queries B in order to compute the
number of common nodes in their neighboring graphs without
disclosing the neighboring graphs themselves. The cardinality
of the intersection between the two neighboring graphs, which
is computed using multivariate polynomial evaluation [21], is
used to find the similarity between the two nodes (ζ). Let
A → B : < message > denote a message sent from A to
B. Let pk and sk be public and private keys, respectively. The
mechanism works as follows:
1) Node A builds a polynomial having roots in each of the
nodes contained in its HA, i.e., A computes the n + 1
coefficients α0, ..., αn of the polynomial
f(y) = α0 + α1y + α2y
2 + ...+ αny
n
for which f(HAi) = 0 for any node in its neighboring
graph.
2) Node A encrypts the coefficients and sends them to B.
A→ B : < EpkA (f(y)) >
3) Node B uses the homomorphic properties of the encryp-
tion scheme to evaluate the polynomial for each node in
its binary vector ΓB , and multiplies each result by a ran-
dom once-use number, obtaining EpkA (nonce ·f(HBi)).
Each node N creates a binary vector ΓN = 〈γ1, ..., γM 〉,
where M = |HN |, for the nodes in its neighboring
graph. If node N has node i ⊂ V in its HN then γNi = 1
else γNi = 0.
4) Node B adds all evaluated polynomials to a list and
permutates the order. Then, B sends the list back to A.
5) Node A decrypts each ciphertext and counts the number
of zeros that it received, after receiving the list of
evaluated polynomials from node B. If there is a node in
the intersection HA
⋂
HB , then the ciphertexts decrypt
to zero. Otherwise, it decrypts to a random value. Hence,
ζAB is the number of zeros decrypted by node A.
2) The link privacy mechanism: ePRIVO deals with link
disclosure since each node’s ego network contains the list of
neighbors and their social strengths. To ensure link privacy,
ePRIVO also uses two anonymization techniques that are
suitable for VDTNs as they ensure data utility: neighborhood
randomization and binary anonymization.
3) Neighborhood randomization: It consists in partially
hiding each node’s neighboring graph containing its historical
encounter information. When two nodes are in communication
range, they only exchange ζAB nodes in their neighboring
graphs. If wi,j is high, it might mean that nodes i and j have
a strong tie (i.e., that they meet often), or even that they have
met recently. The latter may be a random link, that is, a recent
occasional connection that looks like a strong tie.
Neighborhood randomization works as follows: upon an
encounter between nodes i and j and differently from PRIVO,
they run the similarity privacy mechanism to obtain ζAB . Ran-
domly selecting nodes to add to the anonymized neighboring
graph that will be shared allows mixing random contacts with
strong contacts, therefore hiding the contact patterns among
neighbors since pweights are constantly being updated. If i
and j re-encounter after a short period of time, they can share
the same previous information, therefore, avoiding to disclose
more historical information. Ideally, upon an encounter be-
tween nodes i and j, the anonymized neighboring graph of j
should only contain information of common nodes it has with
i. This information is useful for i to update its ego network.
4) Binary anonymization: It consists in replacing the
pweight associated to a given link with 1 or 0, if the weight
is above or below a given anonymization threshold (ρ), re-
spectively. This technique converts the weighted (randomized
or not) neighborhood graph into an unweighted one, therefore
hiding the pweight associated to a given edge. The selection
of ρ is also limited by the utility of the neighboring graph.
Consider, for example, that node a has nodes b, c and
d as its neighbors with pweights (wa,b = 0.05, wa,c =
0.15, wa,d = 0.65). If ρ is set to 0.1, the anonymized pweights
are (w∗a,b = 0, w
∗
a,c = 1, w
∗
a,d = 1). But, if instead ρ is
set to 0.25, the anonymized pweights would become (w∗a,b =
0, w∗a,c = 0, w
∗
a,d = 1). If node a meets another node, say node
e, a would tell e that its neighbors are (wa,c = 1, wa,d = 1)
for ρ = 0.1 and (wa,d = 1) for ρ = 0.25.
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C. Determination of routing metrics
ePRIVO represents the dynamics of the social structure as
time-varying weighted neighboring graphs, where the weights
(i.e., social strengths among nodes) express the average sepa-
ration period over different timeslots.
1) Ego betweenness centrality: Each node’s ego network
corresponds to its neighboring graph if the pweigths are
above a given weight threshold (ε). Since the connections
among the ego direct neighbors are also necessary for the ego
network, each node shares its anonymized neighboring graph
(as explained in Section IV-B) with its neighbors.
Given a set of configuration parameters (see Section VI-A
for more details), the determination of ε can be seen as an
optimization problem consisting in finding the ε that max-
imizes (or minimizes) a certain routing performance metric
(e.g., finding ε that maximizes the delivery ratio).
2) Weighted similarity to the destination: Let An be the
weighted adjacency matrix of node n at a given timeslot.
Let Ani,j = wi,j . If nodes i and j have met before, then
wi,j 6= 0; otherwise, wi,j=0. The weighted similarity of n to
a destination node d (sd) is obtained by summing the non-
zero row entries in Ani,d |i 6= n. If n never met d but node i
belonging to n’s neighboring graph did, n may infer that i is
a more suitable forwarder to d than it through i’s anonymized
neighboring graph.
3) Mean time to encounter: Besides pweight, ePRIVO also
uses a metric called mean time to encounter (MTTE) to deter-
mine the best message forwarder to a given destination taking
into account the average separation period at each timeslot
and the expected time necessary for the two nodes to re-
encounter. Specifically, given that in ePRIVO each node keeps
an estimate of the average separation period at each timeslot
that is updated as nodes encounter each other, ePRIVO predicts
the most probable timeslot for future contacts also taking into
account the shortest time to re-encounter. As an example,
consider that node a meets nodes b and c at 2pm and 5pm
for 10 and 15 minutes, respectively. At 8pm, node a receives
a message destined to node d that is expected to meet nodes
b and c on the next day. When node a computes the average
separation periods of b and c, it also considers the time to
re-encounter nodes b and c in the following day assuming that
these nodes maintain similar habits.
D. Routing algorithm
This section describes the routing algorithm of ePRIVO, that
is, the messages exchanged using the Paillier homomorphic
encryption scheme and the routing decision process.
1) The attribute privacy mechanism: ePRIVO ensures at-
tribute privacy, as regardless of the metric (m) used by the
routing algorithm (pweight, similarity to the destination, or
ego betweenness centrality – {wi,j , sd, cEBC}⊂ m), which
represent utility, when two nodes meet they find the best
forwarder in a private manner using the Paillier homomorphic
encryption scheme.
Let A be a node carrying a set of messages M and node
B be a neighbor of A. Let A → B : < message > denote
a message sent from A to B. Upon an encounter, A wants to
Fig. 2. Scheme of the messages exchanged during the execution of ePRIVO
know if B is a better forwarder to carry m ∈ M destined to
node D. Let pk and sk be public and private key, respectively.
The exchange of messages in ePRIVO works as follows:
1. Node A calculates metric m for each m ∈M using the
information it has available.
2. Each time A establishes a contact with another node,
it announces: −mi ∀ Di ⊂ mi| i = 1, 2, . . . |M|, the
destination of the message and its public key (pkA ) to
B. Node A multiplies the metric mi by -1 to reduce the
number of cryptographic operations to be performed by
node B.
A→ B : < EpkA (−mAi) , Dmi , pkA >
3. Node B performs for each metric received the following
operations: first, B sums −mAi to the corresponding
metric mBi , then it multiplies the result by a random
once-use number (nonce) to randomize it. Without the
multiplication, A would be able to obtain mBi . Then B
sends the result Ri = nonce · (−mAi + mBi) to A.
B → A : < EpkA (Ri) >
4. A decrypts the received comparisons for each mi.
DskA
(
EpkA (Ri)
)
Node A knows that if Ri > 0 → mA < mB which
means that node B is a better forwarder. If that is the
case, A forwards mi to B.
A→ B :< mi >
Fig. 2 provides a scheme of the messages exchanged during
each phase of the protocol.
Obtaining the best forwarder can be demanding in terms
of CPU, energy, etc., due to the number of messages that
have to be exchanged in the process. In ePRIVO, each
node has a secure forwarding table (SFT) containing entries
<DestinationNode (DN), BestForwarder (BF)> that is updated
each time a node meets another one that is a better forwarder
than it. When the average separation period between two
nodes is updated, if one of those nodes is a BF in the SFT,
the entry is removed. SFT allows reducing the number of
messages exchanged when two nodes meet therefore reducing
also ePRIVO’s consumption of resources.
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2) The routing decision process: Four variants of ePRIVO
are proposed. ePrivoASP uses as routing metric pweight.
ePrivoMTTE uses as routing metric the mean time to en-
counter. ePrivoSDBC, which is the social version of ePRIVO,
uses as routing metric weighted similarity to the destina-
tion and ego betweenness centrality. ePrivoCOMBINED is
a combination of ePrivoMTTE and ePrivoSDBC. It results
from multiplying the routing metrics of ePrivoMTTE and
ePrivoSDBC.
3) Forwarding policy: After the execution of the attribute
privacy mechanism, node A knows if the execution was
successful and if node B is more suitable to carry message
mi towards its destination. Since the number of copies of
every message flowing through the network will be directly
determined by the forwarding policy used, A decides if the
message has to be forwarded to B, and if it will keep a copy
of mi. That is, A decides based on the forwarding policy used
and this decision may have an impact on the performance of
ePRIVO. ePRIVO is compatible with any forwarding policy.
Next, a not exhaustive list of forwarding policies is pre-
sented. A study and analysis aiming at identifying the best
policy for each scenario will be conducted in Section VI-B4.
Node A always forwards m ∈ M to another more suitable
node, say node B, but in the
• direct single-copy policy, no copies of m are created.
• direct multi-copy policy, node A keeps a copy of m.
• limited multi-copy policy, node A can only create a
limited number of copies of m. When A reaches the
threshold for m, no more copies of m are created, nor it
is forwarded to another node, say node C. The threshold
can be defined based on different strategies for every node
and message.
V. PRIVACY ANALYSIS
This section analyses the knowledge obtained by each
participant of ePRIVO under the scope of secure multi-party
computations [30].
On a network where different participants hold each an
input, a secure multi-party computation consists in computing
a function on any input and ensuring that no more information
is revealed to a participant (or node), say A, than what
can be inferred from A’s input and the computed output.
Two adversary modes are considered: active and passive. In
the former, node A executes the protocol and then makes
inferences to obtain knowledge about the inputs of another
node, say B. In the latter, node A tampers its messages to try
to obtain an advantage. Then, a reasoning about the privacy
obtained in the two modes is presented.
A. Passive adversary mode
To consider ePRIVO as a secure protocol [31], it is neces-
sary to prove that it reveals only the result of the function and
the inferences that can be deduced from this output with one
or more input values. Here, for example, routing is treated as
a secure multi-party computation problem where the result of
the routing algorithm has to be computed using private data
held by the candidate nodes to carry messages.
In the passive adversary mode, node A exchanges truthful
messages and then analyses them trying to obtain information
about the metrics or neighboring graph of node B.
The similarity privacy mechanism protects node A’s privacy
by hiding its neighboring graph from node B. HA is first en-
coded as the coefficients of a polynomial, and then transmitted
to B in encrypted form. B cannot decrypt it due to the prop-
erties of the Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme but can
perform simple operations on the received values. B computes
a function that takes A’s encrypted values and its own values
as inputs and sends the result to A, that decrypts using its
private key. A’s inputs are hidden because of the multiplication
by random once-use numbers. The same plaintext encrypted
twice results in two different outputs because the encryption
scheme is probabilistic, hence preventing parties from directly
comparing the encrypted values. However, node A discloses
the number of nodes that are being compared by subtracting
the number of coefficients over the number of polynomials.
The latter allows node B to decide a minimum number
of nodes below which it will not compute the intersection,
therefore preventing A from running the mechanisms for a
neighboring graph composed of one node only and learning
whether or not B’s neighboring graph possesses that specific
node.
The similarity privacy mechanism achieves security in the
semi-honest setting [32]. The latter setting assumes that the
parties do not deviate from the protocol. However, the mech-
anism is not secure against active adversaries. Meanwhile, an
active eavesdropper deploying a man-in-the-middle attack, for
example, by modifying the messages between the parties, can
be detected by adding signatures to the messages, the case of
a malicious node A or B may require modifications to the
mechanism. Specifically, a zero-knowledge proof protocol can
be used to prevent B from pretending it always has a degree
of similarity with A. It is assumed here that B has no interest
in pretending not to have a similarity with A since in that case,
it could just not reply to A’s queries.
Some knowledge can be obtained by node A at the end of
both link and attribute privacy mechanisms.
The link privacy mechanism protects privacy by obfus-
cating, that is, by mixing strong with random links and by
modifying the weights of links of the neighboring graphs of
the nodes. Nevertheless, node A obtains some information
about the other nodes that node B came in contact with
and vice-versa. According to the mechanism, if two nodes
have multiple consecutive encounters, they share the same
anonymized information, which will be outdated as at the
end of each encounter among two nodes, they update their
neighboring graphs accordingly.
For the attribute privacy mechanisms, if node B is found to
be more suitable to carry the message, then A infers that B is a
better candidate and that mB is higher than mA. If B is found
to be less suitable, then A infers that mB is lower than mA,
but neither A nor B knows the order of magnitude in which
mB is higher or lower than mA. The knowledge that can be
learned by A, which carries the message, about mB , i.e., the
metric of B can be inferred, in all cases, using the output of
the protocol and the input provided by A. No information can
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be learned from the messages exchanged with B as the ones
that A can decrypt are randomized through the use of random
nonce values.
The knowledge obtained by B depends on the forwarding
policy of A. Recall that B does not know the output of the
mechanism. It only knows that the message has finally been
forwarded or not to it. If it is considered that the forwarding
policy used makes possible not to send the message when B is
more suitable, or to send the message even if B is less suitable,
then B cannot infer the output of the mechanism. Thus, in
this case, B cannot learn anything about mA. Next, the worst-
case scenario is considered where B knows A’s forwarding
policy, i.e., a direct single- or multi-copy forwarding policy
that allows node B to know the output of the attribute privacy
mechanism from the forwarding of the message. If the message
is sent, B infers that it is a more suitable candidate than A.
If the message is not sent, B learns that it is a less suitable
candidate. No information can be learned from the message
received from node A because mA is encrypted with A’s key.
In summary, all that can be learned by node A about mB ,
or by node B about mA, from the attribute privacy mechanism
is also learnable from the output alone. Hence, the attribute
privacy mechanism protects the privacy of both nodes A and
B as it reveals only the result of the algorithm and inferences
derived from this result.
B. Active adversary mode
In the active adversary mode, it is considered that an
attacker may use untruthful information about its own metric,
the messages it carries, or about its neighboring graph, in order
to disclose private information about the other part’s metrics
or neighboring graph.
Node B does not initiate the execution of the attribute
privacy mechanism, nor controls the number of messages
that will be forwarded. The only chance B has to lie is by
manipulating the results of the comparisons sent in Step 3.
Node B can lie about its metric, using m
′
B instead of mB , or it
can lie about its neighboring graph sending H
′
B =
(
V
′
B , E
′
B
)
instead of HB = (VB , EB) for the link privacy mechanism.
Given that using a tampered H
′
B will lead to the calculation
of an approximate ego betweenness centrality and weight
similarity to the destination, the latter is similar to the binary
anonymization case. For the attribute privacy mechanism,
node B may obtain more information about mA by lying
than by being truthful only if it finally receives the message
and m
′
B > mB , or if it does not receive the message and
m
′
B < mB . In both cases, mA is unknown to B. For these
reasons, there is not a straightforward strategy to select m
′
B
that guarantees that B will take an advantage from it.
In summary, an active attacker can try to learn things about
the other part’s metric by using untruthful information during
the execution of the attribute privacy mechanism. Node A can
try to learn the metric of node B and vice-versa. In both cases,
the attacker obtains the same information that it could infer
from a truthful execution of the mechanism.
As A is the one starting the transaction, it is the only one
that knows the number of messages that it carries, and to
determine how many times to execute the attribute privacy
mechanism. If A executes the mechanism enough times, using
untruthful information, it may completely uncover mB . There
is no way for a node to distinguish a truthful execution of the
attribute privacy mechanism from an untruthful one given that
nodes always operate with encrypted data. However, node B
can decrease the effectiveness of these attacks by limiting the
number of interactions per unit of time with every other node.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
This section presents the simulation model and results
regarding the performance evaluation of ePRIVO.
A. The simulation model
ePRIVO was implemented in the Opportunistic Network
Environment (ONE) simulator [33]. Different simulation sce-
narios consisting of synthetic mobility models and a real
mobility trace were considered. It is assumed here, as in most
networks of interest, that there is some social structure between
the nodes participating in the network. Each source node
generated a new message according to the following intervals:
0.5 to 1 min (0.5-1), 1 to 2 min (1-2), 2 to 4 min (2-4), 4 to 8
min (4-8), and 8 to 16 min (8-16). The length of the timeslots
varied from 5, 10, 15, 30 and 60 min corresponding to 288,
144, 96, 48 and 24 timeslots per day, respectively. Similarly to
values normally used in the Round Trip Time (RTT) estimation
in the Transport Control Protocol (TCP) [34], α and β were
set to 0.125 and 0.25, respectively. The weight threshold and
number of timeslots were set to 1×10−8 and 144 respectively,
as explained in [5].
1) Synthetic mobility models: The simulation time was 7
days with an update interval of 1.0 s. Map-based mobility
models of Helsinki city over an area of 4.5 × 3.4 Km and
Barcelona city over an area of 12 × 12 Km were used. The
message size varies from 1 MB to 5 MB. Only two nodes
within range can communicate with each other at a time.
According to [35], communication in urban environments are
highly impaired by obstacles and increasing the transmis-
sion range until a certain point saturates the throughput due
to higher interference. It was assumed that all nodes used
Bluetooth and 802.11a Wi-Fi interfaces. Given that Helsinki
and Barcelona cities are urban areas, the communication
range between nodes was 10 m and the communication was
bidirectional at a constant transmission rate of 2 Mbit/s for
the Bluetooth interface. For the Wi-Fi interface, the following
communication ranges and transmission rates were considered:
10 m with 10 Mbit/s, and 30 m with 6 Mbit/s, respectively.
From time to time, a source node randomly chosen generated
one message to a randomly chosen destination. Three mobility
models were considered:
a) Shortest-path Map-Based Movement (SPMBM):
SPMBM [5] consisted of a network with 40 pedestrians, 80
cars and 6 trams in Helsinki city. Pedestrians were moving at
a speed varying between 0.8 to 1.4 m/s. Cars and trams were
moving at a speed varying between 2.7 to 13.9 m/s. Each time
a tram reaches its destination, it paused for 60 to 300 s. The
TTL attribute of each message was 5 h. The pedestrians and
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY 10
cars had a buffer size of 128 MB. Trams had a buffer size of
512 MB for VDTN traffic.
b) Working Day Movement (WDM): WDM [36] con-
sisted of a network with 110 pedestrians and 32 buses in
Helsinki city. There were 50 offices and the working day
length was 8 h. The probability of going shopping after work
was 50% and there were 10 meeting points. Pedestrians and
buses were moving at a speed varying between 0.8 to 1.4 m/s
and 7 to 10 m/s, respectively. Each time a bus reaches its
destination, it paused for 60 to 300 s. The TTL attribute of
each message was 24 h. All nodes had a buffer size of 128
MB for VDTN traffic.
c) Map-Based Movement (MBM): MBM consisted of a
network with 90 cars and 6 RSUs in Barcelona city. Cars were
moving at a speed varying between 2.7 to 13.9 m/s. Each time
a vehicle reaches its destination, it paused for 60 to 300 s. The
TTL attribute of each message was 5 h. Cars and RSUs had
a buffer size of 128 and 512 MB, respectively. From time
to time, a car randomly chosen generated one message to a
randomly chosen RSU.
2) Real mobility trace: The taxicabs in Rome (TR) [37]
traces, which resembles a set of vehicles across a different
network and mobile environment, are used to provide ad-
ditional support to the analysis and findings of this article.
TR contains GPS coordinates of approximately 320 taxicabs
collected over 30 days in Rome, Italy. The simulation duration
and number of nodes of TR were reduced to 3 days and 304
nodes, respectively. It was assumed that all nodes used an
802.11p Wi-Fi interface with the following communication
ranges and transmission rates: 100 m with 10 Mbit/s, and 250
m with 6 Mbit/s, respectively. The message size varies from
50 KB to 500 KB. All nodes had a buffer size of 10 MB for
VDTN traffic. The TTL attribute of each message was 24 h.
B. Simulation results
In this section, several simulation results describing the
performance of ePRIVO are presented. For each setting, i.e.,
protocol-configuration parameter pair, at most five independent
simulations using different message generation seeds were
conducted, and the results averaged, for statistical confidence.
ePRIVO was compared with privacy-preserving routing proto-
cols, namely PRIVO and PrivHab+ [22], and with well-known
DTN routing protocols [5]: two non-social-based routing pro-
tocols, namely Epidemic and Prophet, and two social-based
routing protocols, namely BubbleRap and dLife.
The four variants of ePRIVO were considered: ePrivoASP,
ePrivoMTTE, ePrivoSDBC and ePrivoCOMBINED.
The performance of ePRIVO was evaluated according to the
following metrics: delivery ratio, overhead ratio, and crypto-
graphic cost. The delivery ratio is a key performance indicator
as it tells the percentage of successfully received packets of
all sent. The overhead ratio is the number of message trans-
missions for each delivered message. The cryptographic cost,
because of homomorphic encryption, gives the computation
and transmission cost incurred by cryptographic operations.
The performance of ePRIVO under different forwarding
policies will be evaluated. The following forwarding policies
were considered: direct single-copy policy (DSCP), direct
multi-copy policy (DMCP) and limited multi-copy policy
(LMCP).
In addition, information loss (or data utility) due to the
use of anonymization methods will also be evaluated. This
will be accomplished by analyzing the correlation coeffi-
cients between a non-anonymized version of ePRIVO and the
anonymized ones over the simulations.
1) The routing performance of ePRIVO with DMCP: This
section analyses the routing performance of ePRIVO with
the DMCP policy (hereafter ePRIVO*) without the use of
homomorphic encryption.
Fig. 3 presents the average delivery ratio and overhead
ratio for different scenarios, routing protocols, and message
generation rates. As expected, with the decrease of the data
rate there is an increase in delivery ratio and a decrease of the
overhead ratio as fewer messages circulated in the network.
Overall, ePRIVO* performed better than other routing
protocols in all message generation rates and scenarios in
terms of delivery and overhead ratios. However, the perfor-
mance of each ePRIVO* variant depends on the scenario.
The routing protocols that presented the highest delivery ratio
were ePrivoASP* for TR and ePrivoSDBC* for SPMBM and
WDM. The maximum gains obtained for both transmission
rates are presented in Table II. Among the non-ePRIVO
routing protocols, the ones that presented the highest delivery
ratios were Epidemic for SPMBM and WDM, and dLife
for TR. Therefore, if there are some repetitive movement
patterns then ePrivoSDBC* is the best choice, otherwise, it
is ePrivoASP*.
In terms of overhead ratio, Epidemic performed worst due
to its unlimited replication approach and was followed by
Prophet. For instance, dLife presented the lowest overhead
in most cases. ePRIVO* variants presented the second lowest
values of overhead ratio. However, they also performed better
in terms of the delivery ratio as explained before.
TABLE II
MAXIMUM AVERAGE DELIVERY RATIO GAINS IN DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
FOR DIFFERENT MESSAGE GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION RATES (%)
Transmission rate Mobility modelSPMBM WDM TR
6 Mbit/s 1.7 37.6 54.6
10 Mbit/s 8.0 37.6 59.8
2) Cryptographic costs: This section analyses the crypto-
graphic cost of using the Paillier homomorphic encryption
scheme.
a) Additive homomorphic encryption: A set of experi-
ments were performed to evaluate the performance of additive
homomorphic encryption using the Paillier cryptosystem. The
experiments were performed on a personal computer with
the following specifications: Intel® CORE™ i7-2600 CPU
@ 3.40GHz, 16 GB RAM and Windows 10 Pro (64-bits).
Table III presents the average Paillier execution time of
five operations, namely encryption E (a), decryption D (c),
sum E (a+ b), difference E (a− b) and multiplication by a
constant E (k · a). The difference is performed by multiplying
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(a) Delivery ratio
(b) Overhead ratio
Fig. 3. Delivery and overhead ratios for all the routing protocols considered in different scenarios for different message generation rates with a transmission
rate of 10 Mbit/s.
the second term by -1 followed by summing the numbers,
therefore being slower than sum and multiplication by a
constant. The operations were repeated 100 times.
b) The performance of ePRIVO* with Paillier: Now,
messages were generated every 8 to 16 min. Table IV presents
the average delivery ratio losses (+) and gains (-) of ePRIVO*
using the Paillier cryptosystem with key sizes of 1024, 2048
and 3072 bits for η = 144. Each table entry results from
averaging losses and gains of all ePRIVO* variants per key.
From Table IV, it is possible to see that the losses are below
3% in all scenarios, with exception of WDM, therefore the use
of the Paillier homomorphic encryption was not considered in
the previous subsection (Section VI-B1).
A more detailed analysis was performed for the legacy key
size (i.e., 1024 bits). Table V presents the average delivery
ratio losses (+) and gains (-) using the Paillier cryptosystem
for η = 144.
It was concluded, based on simulation results, that if a
message was not transmitted because of the additional delay
caused by homomorphic encryption, it would be transmitted
later on. In some cases (see Table IV and Table V), this
additional delay is beneficial to the routing protocol, as it may
contribute to the reduction of the network load, even though
the maximum achieved gains being negligible (at most 0.50%
for the legacy key).
3) Information loss: This section analyses the utility of the
data (or information loss) because of the use of anonymization
methods. Information loss is measured by comparing the
correlation coefficients [38] of the ego betweenness centrality
values of all the nodes in the simulation with and without
anonymization. The ego betweenness values were collected
at the end of each day and the values were compared for
different percentages of total anonymization with the case were
no anonymization was used. Total anonymization corresponds
to the total number of nodes in the neighboring graph that
are anonymized. Binary anonymization was applied over a
percentage of the latter. At the end of each simulation, the
correlation coefficients were averaged taking into account the
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TABLE III
AVERAGE PAILLIER EXECUTION TIMES (MS)
Key Size E (a) D (c) E (a+ b) E (a− b) E (k · a)
1024 11.03 ± 0.1261 11.29 ± 0.3552 0.03 ± 0.0019 0.74 ± 0.0425 0.05 ± 0.0023
2048 83.49 ± 0.3029 83.9 ± 0.4546 0.06 ± 0.0033 1.74 ± 0.0719 0.14 ± 0.0038
3072 271.96 ± 0.123 261.32 ± 0.122 0.08 ± 0.001 3.11 ± 0.007 0.40 ± 0.002
TABLE IV
AVERAGE DELIVERY RATIO LOSSES (+) AND GAINS (-) USING THE
PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEM (%)
Scenarios Key size (bits)1024 2048 3072
SPMBM 0.09 0.51 2.58
WDM 4.97 18.28 30.64
TR -0.12 0.0 0.45
TABLE V
AVERAGE DELIVERY RATIO LOSSES (+) AND GAINS (-) USING THE
PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEM WITH 1024 BITS KEY (%)
ePRIVO* Variants ScenariosSPMBM WDM TR
ePrivoASP* 0.12 4.72 0.00
ePrivoMTTE* 0.24 4.02 0.00
ePrivoSDBC* 0.00 5.56 0.00
ePrivoCOMBINED* 0.00 5.60 -0.49
number of days of the simulation. Different percentages of
binary and total anonymization were used. The former varied
from 10% to 90% with increments of 10% and the latter varied
from 20% to 80% with increments of 20%.
Fig. 4 presents the average correlation coefficient (CC)
and the delivery ratio (DR) for ePrivoSDBC* in the TR
scenario. Between binary anonymization and neighborhood
randomization, the former is the one to cause a reduction
on the average correlation coefficients as it increases, and
this effect worsens as the percentage of total anonymization
increases. Nonetheless, since ePrivoSDBC* uses ego between-
ness centrality and weighted similarity to the destination and
the latter is more frequently used as a routing metric, the
effects of the lowest values of correlation coefficients (i.e.,
0.86 for TR corresponding to 90% of binary anonymization
and 80% of total anonymization) are not significant as can be
seen by the steady average delivery ratio in Fig. 4.
4) ePRIVO’s forwarding policies: This section analyses
the routing performance of ePRIVO with different forwarding
policies. Fig. 5 presents the average delivery ratio losses (+)
and gains (-) of ePRIVO in SPMBM, WDM and TR scenarios
for DSCP, DMCP and LMCP forwarding policies for different
message generation rates using the legacy key as compared
with the scenario without key.
In general, the reduction of the message generation rates
caused a reduction of the average losses and gains of different
forwarding policies for SPMBM, WDM and TR scenarios,
respectively. At one side is DMCP that presents the highest
losses and gains due to the excessive number of messages
Fig. 4. The average correlation coefficient (CC) and the delivery ratio (DR)
for ePrivoSDBC* in the TR scenario for different percentages of total (A)
and binary anonymizations
Fig. 5. Average delivery ratio losses (+) and gains (-) of ePRIVO in different
scenarios with different message generation rates using the legacy key
generated by the policy. Please note that despite the losses,
DMCP is the best forwarding policy for the WDM scenario
because of the low opportunity of contacts among nodes that
is characteristic of the scenario. In SPMBM and TR, DMCP
presented the highest gains as the forwarding policy was the
most affected by the increase of the message generation rates.
Recall that the node density in TR is higher if compared to
SPMBM and WDM and the nodes did not follow predefined
routines. On the other hand, LMCP presented the lowest losses
in comparison to DMCP and DSCP because of the controlled
replication strategy that was beneficial in most cases.
5) ePRIVO’s routing performance: This section analyses
the routing performance of ePRIVO in comparison with
PRIVO and PrivHab+. ePRIVO uses a combination of different
forwarding policies that depend on, for example, the scenario
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON VEHICULAR TECHNOLOGY 13
(a) SPMBM
(b) TR
Fig. 6. Comparison of delivery ratio between ePRIVO and PRIVO for SPMBM and TR scenarios with different message generation rates and key sizes
considered, the message generation rates, among others.
Fig. 6 presents a comparison of the delivery ratio between
ePRIVO and PRIVO for SPMBM and TR scenarios with
different message generation rates and key sizes.
In WDM, both protocols behaved similarly as most of the
time they were using the same forwarding policy, that is, both
protocols used DMCP. The latter was the main reason why the
WDM graph in Figure Fig. 6 was omitted. The main difference
between PRIVO and ePRIVO was that for the lowest message
generation rate (i.e., 4-8min), ePRIVO also used LMCP that
allowed it to obtain a slightly higher delivery ratio. According
to Table VI, the average delivery ratio gains of ePRIVO in
comparison to PRIVO for WDM were negligible, being at
most 0.47% for the 3072 bits key and mainly for the lowest
message generation rates.
In SPMBM and TR, ePRIVO outperformed PRIVO because
it used a combination of forwarding policies. Specifically,
ePRIVO used LMCP for the high message generation rates
and DMCP for low message generation rates. According to
Table VI, the average delivery ratio gains were 33.12, 27.57
and 23.98% for 1024, 2048 and 3072 bits of key sizes for TR,
respectively.
Fig. 7 presents a comparison of the delivery and overhead
ratios between ePRIVO and PrivHab+ for the MBM scenario
with different message generation rates. MBM consisted of
RSUs that were static and vehicles that were moving. Hence,
the goal here was for vehicles to forward messages using V2V
communications until they reach the RSUs. Please recall that
PrivHab+ is a geographical-based privacy-preserving routing
protocol aiming at pushing the message as close as possible
to the destination node’s position. Simulations results showed
that ePRIVO outperformed PrivHab+ in terms of the delivery
ratio by presenting maximum delivery ratio gains of 288%.
However, and since ePRIVO’s aim was to maximize the deliv-
ery ratio, it also presented higher overhead ratio in comparison
to PrivHab+ but smaller than the one presented in Figure 3(b).
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Fig. 7. Comparison of delivery and overhead ratios between ePRIVO and
PrivHab+ for the MBM scenario with different message generation rates and
a transmission rate of 6 Mbit/s
ePRIVO could limit the number of copies that circulate on
the network by means of the LMCP forwarding policy if the
objective was to reduce the overhead ratio. By doing so, a
maximum reduction of 91.3% would be attained.
In summary, there is not a one-solution-fits-all in terms of
forwarding policies since the best results mostly depend on a
combination of forwarding policies.
TABLE VI
AVERAGE EPRIVO’S DELIVERY RATIO GAINS AS COMPARED WITH
PRIVO (%)
Scenarios Key size (bits)0 1024 2048 3072
SPMBM 1.92 2.52 5.77 9.27
WDM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.47
TR 31.73 33.12 27.57 23.98
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This article proposed ePRIVO, an enhanced PRIvacy-
preserVing Opportunistic routing protocol for Vehicular
Delay-Tolerant Networks. ePRIVO ensures link privacy by
means of binary anonymization and neighborhood randomiza-
tion, and attribute privacy by means of the Paillier homomor-
phic encryption scheme. In addition, ePRIVO proposed the
similarity privacy mechanism that allowed nodes to calculate
their similarity in a private manner.
The effectiveness of ePRIVO is supported through extensive
simulations with synthetic mobility models and a real mobility
trace. Simulation results show that ePRIVO presents on av-
erage very low cryptographic costs in most scenarios, and if
there are some repetitive movement patterns then ePrivoSDBC
is the best choice, otherwise, it is ePrivoASP. Furthermore,
ePRIVO presents on average gains of approximately 4.87 and
29.1% in terms of the delivery ratio for SPMBM and TR
scenario compared to PRIVO, respectively. In addition, it also
presents average maximum gains of 238.4% in terms of the
delivery ratio for the MBM scenario compared to PrivHab+.
As future work, the following research challenges have
been identified: (i) the evaluation of ePRIVO with a synthetic
mobility model and real mobility trace composed of a very
high number of vehicles and (ii) testing ePRIVO in a real
testbed.
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